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Samuel Beckett, Wilhelm Windelband, and 
the Interwar “Philosophy Notes”
David Addyman and Matthew Feldman
Between the years 1930 and 1938 Samuel Beckett went 
through an extensive process of self-education, taking notes on 
psychology, art history, the history of German and English lit-
eratures, and Irish and European history, in addition to notes on 
specific writers as divergent as Dante and d’Annunzio, Mauthner 
and Mistral, Augustine and Ariosto.1 Despite protestations later 
in his life that he neither read nor understood philosophy, far 
and away the largest portion of these extant “Interwar Notes,” 
are the 266 folios, mostly handwritten recto and verso notebook 
pages, comprising Beckett’s so-called “Philosophy Notes.”2 These 
roughly five hundred sides of typed and handwritten reading 
notes derive from 1932 and 1933—likely around the time Beckett 
was converting his abortive novel, Dream of Fair to Middling 
Women, into the short stories More Pricks Than Kicks (published 
1934). In turn, Beckett’s “Philosophy Notes” were taken from 
four main sources: J. Archibald Alexander’s 1907 A Short His-
tory of Philosophy; John Burnet’s 1914 Greek Philosophy, Part I: 
Thales to Plato; Friedrich Ueberweg’s A History of Philosophy, 
from Thales to the Present Time; and Wilhelm Windelband’s A 
History of Philosophy.3 
Amongst these authors, Beckett’s engagement with, and 
subsequent employment of, Wilhelm Windelband was far and 
away the most profound. In fact, many of those frequently 
recognized as “Beckettian” philosophers— Arnold Geulincx, 
George Berkeley, and Gottfried Leibniz, amongst others—were 
actually first encountered by Beckett in the revised, second edi-
tion of A History of Philosophy from 1901. It is from here, for 
example, that much of the key imagery in Beckett’s first novel 
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756 from 1935–36 (published 1938), Murphy, is drawn, even extending to the oft-cited 
epigraph on Murphy’s mind, heading chapter six.4 Furthermore, while Beckett used 
all four sources for notes on ancient Greek philosophy, covering his first 109 folios, 
A History of Philosophy is most frequently in evidence among the summary sources 
Beckett consulted on ancient philosophy. More significant still, though, is that final 
157 folios are derived solely from Windelband; that is, the remaining 1,600 years of 
Western philosophy in the “Philosophy Notes” are mediated solely by A History of 
Philosophy. Put another way, this volume accounts for more than three-quarters of 
the entire “Philosophy Notes,” which itself may be considered a tale of two halves: 
one, a mosaic of Ancient Greek thinking, deriving from several secondary texts; and 
two, Beckett’s summary of Wilhelm Windelband’s account of the tenets and systems 
ostensibly governing Western philosophy thereafter. 
That said, this quantitative survey of the “Philosophy Notes” should not be taken as 
indicative of Beckett’s wholesale and wholehearted acceptance of Windelband’s views 
on the history of Western philosophy. Far from it: in his encounter with A History of 
Philosophy, in which Windelband’s philosophical views are writ large, Beckett’s note-
taking is shrewdly selective. Since nothing has been written on Windelband in Beckett 
studies to date (this is no less true of Burnet, Alexander, and Ueberweg), however, the 
nature of Beckett’s composition of the notes has never been made apparent. This article 
therefore examines Beckett’s approach to these “Philosophy Notes”: it especially focuses 
on Wilhelm Windelband (a new candidate for “canonical” status amongst Beckettian 
philosophers), and carefully probes not just what Beckett wrote down, but also what 
he omitted—a telling detail that speaks volumes.
While it is not known for certain just what drew Beckett to Windelband, his work 
was certainly well-known in the English-speaking world after James H. Tufts’ transla-
tion of July, 1893; when prefacing the second edition of 1900, Windelband claimed: “A 
large edition of my History of Philosophy [was] exhausted more than two years ago” 
(HP, xi). Its sold-out status had partly resulted from a hyperbolic review in 1893 by 
Egbert Smyth, who coincidentally described A History of Philosophy’s ideal reader: 
“The book deserves the attention of all who would learn how thought has come to be 
what it is, and who would themselves ‘learn to think.’”5 But when Beckett encountered 
Windelband’s work some forty years later, his interest was very nearly the opposite of 
“learning to think.” For this was just at the time Beckett decried “the loutishness of 
learning” in his 1934 poem, “Gnome.” As he informed Anne Atik some four decades 
later, “you have to get back to ignorance.” Put another way, Beckett sought “knowledge 
of non-knowledge,” or in still another formulation, “non-Euclidian logic.”6 Given the 
genocidal disasters brought about by twentieth-century knowledge, to which he was an 
engaged and horrified witness, Beckett’s position of “docta ignorantia” is refreshingly 
heretical. Yet it remains the case that “learning to think” and “unlearning to think” both 
demanded a priori knowledge of systematic thought; in this significant case, via Wind-
elband’s account of Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Friedrich Nietzsche. 
At first sight, it is not self-evident that Beckett made the notes his own, or that he 
even authored them—can the “Philosophy Notes” can be seen as a Beckettian text at all? 
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757His note-taking is often rather slavish. Many of his reading notes on the ancient Greeks, 
for example, are closely summarized or copied nearly verbatim from his sources; this 
is not just the case for the notes from Windelband but for those from Burnet too (and 
to a lesser extent, for entries from Alexander and Ueberweg). One example from the 
perhaps 120,000 words comprising the “Philosophy Notes” is the following (elements 
found in Windelband but not in Beckett’s notes are indicated by square brackets): 
In forming a conception of [the] Sophistic doctrine we have to contend with the difficulty 
that we are made acquainted with them almost exclusively through their victorious op-
ponents [,] Plato and Aristotle. The first has given in the Protagoras a [graceful,] lively 
delineation of a Sophist congress, [redolent with fine irony,] in the Gorgias a more earnest, 
in the Theaetetus a sharper criticism, and in the Cratylus and Euthydemus supercilious 
satire of the Sophists’ methods of teaching. In the dialogue the Sophist [,] to which Plato’s 
name is attached, an extremely malicious definition of the theories of the Sophists is at-
tempted, and Aristotle reaches the same result in the book on the fallacies of the Sophists. 
(TCD 10967, 40v–41, taken from HP, 71.)
While the near-verbatim transcription illustrated above becomes less frequent and gives 
way to greater use of paraphrasing as Beckett progresses through A History of Philosophy, 
there is very little by way of interpolation in the notes. Windelband’s brief discussion 
of Arnold Geulincx—representing Beckett’s first introduction to the post-Cartesian 
“Occasionalist” philosopher—provides a rare example of Beckett’s textual intervention: 
This furthest developed in Ethics of Geulincx. Illustration of the 2 Clocks which having 
once been synchronised by same artificer continue to move in perfect harmony, “absque 
ulla causalitate qua alterum hoc in altero causat, sed propter meram dependentiam, qua 
utrumque ab eadem arte et simili industria constitutum est”. 
What anthropologism!
(TCD 10967, 189, taken from HP, 415)7
More characteristic, though, are Beckett’s notes on the Sophists and Protagoras. Here, 
over eleven pages Beckett’s only insertion is the word “Et alors” in the following pas-
sage (where the original reads “What then?”): 
[Protagoras] is said to have met Zeno at Athens, when problem of continuity was discussed: 
Z [Zeno]: Tell me, P [Protagoras], does a single grain of millet, or ten thousandth part of 
one, make a noise in falling?
P: No. 
Z: Does a bushel of millet make a noise in falling?
P: Yes.
Z: Et alors . . . Is there not a ration of a bushel of millet to 1 grain and ten thousandth 
of 1 grain [?] 
P: Yes.
Z: Then will not the sounds leave the same ratio? As the sounding objects to one another, 
so the sounds. There if the bushel makes a noise, the grain and ten thousandth grain will 
make a noise. (TCD 10967, 45–46v)
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process of learning in his postwar work, this image provides the opening line from 
the 1958 Endgame: “Finished, it’s finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished. 
[Pause.] Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there’s a heap, a little 
heap, the impossible heap.”8 Similarly, the 1946 Mercier and Camier expresses this 
Sophist paradox as: “every millet grain that falls, you look behind and there you are, 
every day a little closer, all life a little closer.”9 
However, despite appearances, Beckett did not merely copy his sources slavishly. 
In fact, he carefully edited them. For instance, he omitted many passages where the 
views of one of his chosen sources are at odds with his. Beckett’s input into the “Phi-
losophy Notes” is therefore revealed as much in terms of what he left out as what he 
included. In characteristic fashion, Beckett appears as an absence in the notes. The 
most repeated prominent example of this concerns Beckett’s systematic purging of 
Windelband’s interpretative commentary in A History of Philosophy. While, as shown 
above, it is an exaggeration to claim that the “Philosophy Notes” contain no Beckett, 
in terms of philosophical exegesis they certainly contain no Windelband. Indeed, it is 
perhaps symptomatic that Windelband’s name never appears in Beckett’s published 
texts or letters. A very rare reference to the “Philosophy Notes,” made in a letter to 
Alan Schneider of 21 November, 1957, underlined the manner in which Beckett makes 
the notes his own—quite literally in this case: 
I can’t find my notes on the pre-Socratics. The arguments of the Heap and the Bald Head 
(which hair falling produces baldness) were used by all the Sophists and I think have 
been variously attributed to one or the other. They disprove the reality of mass in the 
same way and by means of the same fallacy as the arguments of the Arrow and Achilles 
and the Tortoise, invented a century earlier by Zeno the Eleatic, disprove the reality of 
movement. The leading Sophist, against whom Plato wrote his Dialogue, was Protagoras 
and he is probably the “old Greek” whose name Hamm can’t remember. One purpose of 
the image throughout the play is to suggest the impossibility logically, i.e. eristically, of 
the “thing” ever coming to an end.10 
It is telling that Beckett writes, “I can’t find my notes,” rather than, say, “I can’t find 
the notes I took from Windelband”—despite the fact that the source of the imagery 
is the latter’s work. The figures of the Heap and the Bald Head, for example, come 
from A History of Philosophy, while the word “eristically” appears in the noun form 
on the same page of Windelband’s work (but in none of the other sources that Beckett 
used) (HP, 89, n. 4). Before looking in more detail at how Beckett purged A History 
of Philosophy of Windelband, it is worth looking at what he might have found objec-
tionable in the latter’s account of Western philosophy. To do so, it is necessary to say a 
little more about the life, work, and context of this once-famous German philosopher. 
Wilhelm Windelband was born in 1848, a moment when philosophy in Germany 
was at its lowest ebb—a significant factor, as will be seen, in the composition of A 
History of Philosophy. Nevertheless, he had gained a PhD in philosophy by the age of 
twenty-two, though his career was to be interrupted by the Franco-Prussian war, for 
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1873, and was subsequently appointed lecturer in that city. He also taught at Zurich 
and Freiburg before moving in 1882 to the then-German University of Strasbourg, 
where he was appointed Rector in 1892. His final post was at Heidelberg (1903), 
where he died in 1915. At the last two universities, Windelband made his reputation 
as a philosopher in his own right, even if he is largely remembered today as the author 
of A History of Philosophy. Frederick Copleston, for example, in his 1963 synthesis, 
A History of Philosophy: Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy, 
introduces Windelband as “the well-known historian of philosophy,” but devotes less 
than two pages to his actual thought.11
Nonetheless, at the turn of the century, Windelband was a key figure in the Neo-
Kantian movement then dominating academic philosophy (Schulphilosophie) in Ger-
many at the time, with most university chairs being occupied by representatives of 
the movement. The Neo-Kantians were broadly divided into two camps, the Marburg 
and Baden (also called Southwest German) Schools, and Windelband was long the 
acknowledged leader of the second. While the Marburg School focused on logical, 
epistemological, and methodological themes, for the latter—and for Windelband in 
particular—the key question for fin-de-siècle Western philosophy turned upon the 
demarcation between the natural and the cultural sciences, especially where this related 
to a philosophy of values.12
At this time, academic philosophy was fighting a rearguard action against the seem-
ingly irresistible rise of the materialist sciences in nineteenth-century Europe, ranging 
from Darwinian biology to Rankean history and threatening to obviate the very disci-
pline of philosophy itself. As Windelband put it, “In the nineteenth century, a certain 
paralysis of the philosophical impulse set in.”13 Traditional philosophical debates (such 
as the relation of body to mind) were increasingly held to be translatable into technical 
problems that could be pragmatically solved by the empirical sciences. Philosophy, it 
was argued, had reached its peak with positivism and, in doing so, had effectively ren-
dered itself redundant. Where it was studied at all, it was approached from a historical 
perspective as a catalogue of curiosities; there was no belief in philosophy’s ability to 
offer transcendental norms, because there was no interest in transcendental norms 
in any of the sciences. This condition led Windelband to lament: “Philosophy is like 
King Lear, who has bequeathed all his goods to his children, and who must now resign 
himself to be thrown into the street like a beggar.”14
To rectify this parlous state of affairs—which, one assumes, would ultimately throw 
academic philosophers onto the street—it was vital for Windelband and the other 
Baden Neo-Kantians to redefine the parameters of philosophy and defend the disci-
pline as an autonomous one. In his 1894 Rectorial Address delivered at the University 
of Strasbourg, formally entitled “History and Natural Science,” Windelband outlined 
his philosophical position as an epistemological inquiry into “the relationship of the 
general to the particular” (“RAS,” 175). For him, the proper role of philosophy was 
to evaluate and, above all, critique the first principles and knowledge claims made by 
the newly-independent, materialist disciplines. As Windelband’s Rectorial Address was 
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lecture offers a good indication of Windelband’s thought at the time of composing the 
work that Beckett read so closely. 
Windelband’s contribution to the firestorm engulfing philosophy in Germany was to 
argue that the proper terrain of Western philosophy was knowledge claims. As such, any 
discipline dealing in the acquisition of knowledge—for him, history and psychology in 
particular—was necessarily involved in philosophical inquiry; it was thus fair game for 
philosophical criticism. In this way, Windelband began his address by acknowledging 
the two fashionable routes of discourse open to him: 
The philosopher might well be tempted to provide nothing more than an historical sketch 
of some aspect of his discipline. Or he might take refuge in the specialized empirical 
science which the existing academic customs and dispositions still persist in assigning to 
him: psychology. (“RAS,” 169)
However, he rejects both options, claiming, “I shall not employ either of these routes 
of escape. I do not propose to lend credence to the view that philosophy no longer 
exists, but only its history” (“RAS,” 169–70).
In setting out a different stall, Windelband then considered the differences between 
the natural and cultural sciences. The first is concerned with the form that remains 
constant; and the second, vital to the study of history in particular, was the unique, real 
event. This distinction is used to introduce the now-familiar separation of “nomothetic” 
and “idiographic” methodologies: 
One kind of science is an inquiry into general laws. The other kind of science is an inquiry 
into specific historical facts. In the language of formal logic, the objective of the first 
kind of science is the general, apodictic judgment; the objective of the other kind of sci-
ence is the singular, assertoric proposition. Thus this distinction connects with the most 
important and crucial relationship in the human understanding, the relationship which 
Socrates recognized as the fundamental nexus of all scientific thought: the relationship 
of the general [nomothetic] to the particular [idiographic]. (“RAS,” 175)15
Windelband goes on to complicate this picture, however, by arguing that the two ap-
proaches cannot be so easily separated, either from each other or from philosophy more 
generally. Both make judgments of value. Windelband argued that, for all its focus on 
unique events, history remains intrinsically concerned with value. It is not in the practice 
of listing every fact, but only those considered important within the discipline’s (and 
society’s) value-system: what facts are selected depends on a priori, transcendental 
judgments of value. Windelband offers the following example to illustrate his point: 
In the year 1780, Goethe had a door bell and an apartment key made. On February 
22 of the same year, he had a letter case made. Of this there is documentary proof in a 
locksmith’s bill. Hence it is completely true and certain to have happened. Nevertheless 
it is not an historical fact, neither a fact of literary history nor of biography. (“RAS,” 181) 
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the assumptions underlying the latter. As Frederick C. Beiser holds with respect to 
the issue of this Neo-Kantian “normativity”: 
Philosophy could only retain its identity as a distinct discipline, and it could still be a sci-
ence, Windelband argued, if it only became what Kant had originally conceived it to be: 
namely, a critical philosophy, i.e. an investigations into the conditions and limits of the 
first principles of knowledge. All the special sciences, morality and the arts, presuppose 
first principles that they cannot investigate; and the defining task of philosophy should 
be to investigate just such principles. Philosophy thus retains its validity, albeit as a 
second-order science, whose role is precisely to examine the logic of first-order sciences. 
(“NN–K,” 12–13)
Value was to be philosophy’s currency, critique its method of exchange. In this way, 
Windelband wanted philosophy to concern itself with the value-dependent claims of 
the other sciences. Philosophy could thus remain both independent of (and implicitly 
superior to), the new forms of knowledge knocking at the door of fin-de-siècle Ger-
man Wissenschaft. In the final analysis, then, Windelband not only helped to rescue 
philosophy, he did so by reasserting the transcendental, absolute standards of thought.
 Consequently, Windelband viewed norms as the “central concept of the critical 
philosophy.”16 In fact, as he claimed elsewhere, philosophy itself was nothing more 
than “a system of norms” (“NN–K,” 14). And so, Windelband’s normative critical phi-
losophy, his Neo-Kantianism of the Southwestern German variety in particular, was to 
form the bedrock of a “critical science of universally-valid values.”17 For Windelband, 
in Philip J. Swoboda’s words, “the philosopher does not invent or promulgate norms; 
he merely attempts to separate out of the mass of evaluative judgments actually made 
by individuals and societies over the course of history those which enjoy the sanction 
of the ‘normal consciousness.’”18 For the remainder of his life, Windelband went on 
to investigate the relation between the individual bearer of values, and the transcen-
dent sphere from which these values were held to derive.In this context, A History 
of Philosophy was hardly a neutral account of its subject. Indeed, the book’s subtitle 
announces its partisanship: with especial reference to the formation of development of 
its problems and conceptions. This would be no mere “historical sketch of some aspect 
of [the] discipline,” but one which lays its emphasis on philosophy as an organic whole, 
and one whose conceptions were very much still relevant at the time. There is subtle, 
supporting evidence of Windelband’s interests in the “Preface to the First Edition”: 
The choice of material has fallen everywhere on what individual thinkers have produced 
that was new and fruitful, while purely individual turns of thought, which may indeed be 
a welcome object for learned research, but afford no philosophical interest, have found 
at most a brief mention. (HP, ix)
As Windelband maintains, this is immediately apparent in the “external form” of the 
book, with sections devoted to concepts rather than thinkers; examples being “Authority 
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762 and Revelation,” “The Dualism of Body and Soul,” and “The Problem of Civilisation.” 
On the next page of the preface, he made a bold statement on the value of philosophy 
(like all these prefatory comments, not recorded by Beckett): “To understand this as a 
connected and interrelated whole has been my chief purpose;” it is out of the develop-
ment of philosophical thought that “our theory of the world and life has grown.” The 
suggestion is that history and psychology, as well as the argument that philosophy is no 
longer valid—“our theory of the life and world”—are all themselves held to be derived 
from the achievements of philosophy. Windelband then announced his bias in favor 
of ancient Greek thought (albeit only certain brands of it) and the work of Immanuel 
Kant: “for a historical understanding of our intellectual existence, the forging out of the 
conceptions which the Greek mind wrested from the concrete reality found in Nature 
and human life, is more important than all that has since been thought—the Kantian 
philosophy excepted” (HP, x). 
From the start, then, Windelband’s own interests suffuse A History of Philosophy. 
But these interests run counter to Beckett’s, who, just a handful of years after finish-
ing his “Philosophy Notes,” wrote, in a memorable entry in his “German Diary” of 15 
January 1937, that what he wanted was the “straws, flotsam, etc., names, dates, births 
and deaths” of specific, individual lives—precisely that which Windelband endeavors 
to exclude.19 How, then, are Windelband’s “normativity” and Beckett’s “nominalism” 
(of which more below) to be squared? 
First of all, the second edition of A History of Philosophy includes far more of what 
might be considered “straws, flotsam, etc.” than its earlier incarnation. In the “Au-
thor’s Preface to the Second Edition,” Windelband indicates that some new sections 
have been included, seemingly reluctantly: “A desire has been expressed by readers 
of the book for a more extended notice of the personalities and personal relations of 
the philosophers.” His apologia for not doing so in the first edition was “because of 
the special plan” of his work, but this had to be altered a decade later: “Now I have 
sought to fulfill this demand so far as it has seemed possible within the limit of my 
work, but giving brief and precise characterizations of the most important thinkers” 
(HP, xi–xii). The concessionary material is included in most chapters in smaller font, 
between a general overview of each period and a more detailed look at “its problems 
and concepts.” There appears to have been little attempt to integrate this biographical 
information, however, and it often duplicates content from the preceding or following 
sections. Indeed, it sticks out like the proverbial sore thumb, appearing to underline 
that it is not part of Windelband’s original design. Yet these are very often the entries 
from which Beckett took the closest notes. One excerpt from the “Philosophy of the 
Renaissance” makes this clear: 
Main seat of Platonism was Florentian academy, founded by Cosimo de’ Medici’ [sic]. 
Impulse for this given by Georgius Gemistus Pletho (1355–1450) author of numerous 
commentaries & of a treatise in Greek on the difference between Plato and Aristotle. 
Bessarion (born 1403 Trebizond – d. 1472 Cardinal at Ravenna). Pupil of above. His main 
treatise: Adversus Calumniatorem Platonis (Rome, 1409). 
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of Plato & Plotinus & author of Theologia Platonica (Flor, 1482), & Francesco Patrizzi 
(1529–97) author of Nova de Universis Philosophia (Ferrara 1591). Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola (1463–94) Neo-Platonism alloyed with Neo-Pythagorean & ancient Pythagorean 
motives. (TCD 10967, 172v–173, taken from HP, 354)
Beckett’s “Philosophy Notes” are therefore much less an account of “the formation 
and development of [philosophy’s] concepts” than a list of the “straws, flotsam, etc.” 
Yet if Windelband reluctantly incorporated this biographical material, Beckett hap-
pily imported even more of it, through his weaving of other sources into and between 
his notes from Windelband. Thus, when Windelband discussed the implications of 
Protagoras’s dictum, “man is the measure,” specifically in relation to value (HP, 93), 
Beckett abandoned A History of Philosophy and switched to Burnet, turning not to 
the latter’s own section on “Man is the measure,” but to the opening of the chapter, 
where biographical facts are to be found: 
He legislated for Thourioi 444/3. On this his traditional date is based. Everyone connected 
with Thourioi is supposed to have “flourished” in year of its foundation, and to “flourish” 
is to be 40. Thus Empedocles, Herodotus, and Protagoras are all given as born 484/3 B.C. 
 Celebrated Suit for the Fee (Diog. Laert.) Euathlos was to pay the fee when he had 
won his 1st case. When Protagoras demanded it he said: “I have not won a case yet.” 
P[rotagoras] answered that he would sue him, then he would have to pay “If I win, because 
I have won; if you win because you have won.” 
Interestingly, the idea that to “flourish” is to be 40 is taken from a footnote in Burnet.20 
But even more significant is Beckett’s use of material which appears in footnotes from 
Windelband: time and again, Beckett turns to the German’s footnotes, copying them 
painstakingly. Indeed, the image of the Heap and the Bald Head referred to above 
comes from a footnote, and this is the case for many of the key images that Beckett 
retains from Windelband, like the epigraph to chapter six of Murphy noted above. 
By way of further example, the infamous “Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis,” so central to 
Murphy, is found in a footnote on page 417 of A History of Philosophy. If Beckett’s 
note-taking appears slavish, then it is this slavishness—its attention to detail—that 
provides him with a number of the key images he uses in his fiction. Yet Beckett, by 
including Windelband’s disjecta in the body of his “Philosophy Notes,” and later in-
cluding many of these in fictional texts, creates of Windelband’s work something very 
different from the stated aims of that work. In doing so, he perverts Windelband’s 
take on the transcendental development of Western philosophy, providing the very 
catalogue of detail A History of Philosophy is so keen to avoid. 
Moreover, Windelband’s mediation of Western philosophy—and Beckett’s resistance 
to it—is also apparent in the treatment (or otherwise) of individual philosophies and 
philosophers. This is especially evident where A History of Philosophy treats two related 
doctrines: Sophism, particularly Protagoras’s brand, and nominalism. Windelband’s 
“normative” position unmistakably placed him on one side of the ancient debate be-
tween universals and particulars, or in philosophical parlance, realism and nominalism: 
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take a general position. He must also possess a kind of fortitude that is even more difficult 
to maintain: the boldness to steer his audience onto the high seas of the most abstract 
reflections, where the solid earth threatens to vanish from the eye and disappear beneath 
the feet. (“RAS,” 176) 
By contrast, Beckett’s “Philosophy Notes” are weighted much more towards what 
Murphy dubbed “demented particulars.”21 They tilt toward philosophical schools 
prioritizing this: 
The source of Nominalism is the Aristotelian logic, in particular the De Categoriis. In this 
individual things of experience were designated as true “first” substances . . . Attached to 
this—sensualism, since the individual is that given by the world of sensible reality. (TCD 
10967, 155v–156r, taken from HP, 296)
It might be expected that the exclusion of universals and the attachment to the in-
dividual in this movement was anathema to Windelband; and, indeed, his generally 
even-handed treatment of philosophy breaks down here. In yet another footnote—
not taken down by Beckett—commenting on the nominalists outlined in the passage 
above, he interjects: “How inferior such considerations are to the beginnings of Greek 
thought!” (HP, 296, n. 4)
Windelband’s lumping together of the two schools in order to better dismiss them—in 
this case Aristotelianism and medieval nominalism—is also apparent in his leveling of 
the same charge against Protagoras, namely “sensualism.” And like nominalism, Soph-
ism is a doctrine to which Beckett later returns in his work, in Molloy and Endgame 
and elsewhere. Considering that Beckett’s notes (albeit taken from Alexander this time, 
not Windelband) assert that Protagoras was the “first great individualist, relativist & 
agnostic,” a clash with Windelband’s reading can be expected (TCD 10967, 44).22 Like 
his presentation of nominalism, Windelband’s equanimity is strained in analyzing the 
Sophists; in fact, he is little short of scathing towards them. Nonetheless, he commenced 
his overview by begrudgingly offering them some credit: 
while the Sophists were perfecting the scientific development of the formal art of presen-
tation, verification, and refutation which they had to teach, they indeed created with this 
rhetoric, on the one hand, the beginnings of an independent psychology, and raised this 
branch of investigation from an inferior position which it had taken in the cosmological 
systems to the importance of a fundamental science, and developed, on the other hand, 
the preliminaries for a systematic consideration of the logical and ethical norms.
But Windelband’s mood soon changed, as can be seen in the remainder of the paragraph: 
But as they considered what they practised and taught—viz. the skill to carry through any 
proposition whatsoever—the relativity of human ideas and purposes presented itself to 
their consciousness so clearly and with such overwhelming force that they disowned inquiry 
as to the existence of a universally valid truth in the theoretical, as well as in the practical 
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became frivolous. With their self-complacent, pettifogging advocacy, the Sophists made 
themselves the mouth-piece of all the unbridled tendencies which were undermining the 
order of public life. (HP, 69) 
Characteristically, Windelband considered the Sophists’ most important contribution 
to the development of philosophy to be a preliminary attempt to delimit transcenden-
tal norms. Crucially, by contrast, Beckett’s version of this paragraph retains only the 
following: 
As the Sophists considered what they practised and taught—viz. the skill to carry through 
any proposition whatsoever—the relativity of human ideas and purposes struck them with 
such overwhelming force that they disowned inquiry as to the existence of a universally 
valid [sic] in both theory and practice, and so fell into a scepticism which was at first 
genuine scientific theory and then became frivolous. (TCD 10967, 40–40v)
Beckett’s omission of the word “but” in the midpoint of Windelband’s paragraph, and 
indeed his omission of the first half of the paragraph, gives the passage an entirely 
new orientation—such that it may be read as approving of Sophist doctrine (the last 
three words notwithstanding). A page later, Windelband again devalues the Sophists, 
contrasting their “pettifogging” with “the plain, sound sense, and the pure and noble 
personality” of Socrates; again, Beckett omits this phrase. 
It should be clear, then, that the “Philosophy Notes” are not merely taken passively 
from Windelband (or indeed Burnet, Alexander, or Ueberweg), with little input from 
Beckett. As this article has suggested, Beckett made the “Philosophy Notes” his own 
throughout. Beckett’s authorship appears often as a change of emphasis, as in the re-
weighting of Windelband’s (and Burnet’s) footnotes, and often in the form of an absence, 
as in his purging of Windelband’s views in A History of Philosophy. It should thus come 
as no surprise that Beckett relied upon his meticulously compiled “Philosophy Notes” 
across his oeuvre. However, even when they do not employ images taken directly from 
Windelband, Beckett’s fiction displays a clear distance from the German’s thought, and 
the remainder of this article examines how it does so. 
In the short story, “Ding-Dong,” part of Beckett’s first published work, More Pricks 
than Kicks, the protagonist, Belacqua, stands unable to move in the center of Dublin, 
that city made so famous by Joyce as a place of paralysis. But Belacqua does not suffer 
from the paralysis that affects Joyce’s characters—the unwillingness to do anything 
about one’s fate, so well illustrated by Eveline in the story of the same name.23 He 
suffers from the sense that nothing can come of anything he does, or any direction in 
which he goes: 
He squatted, not that he had too much drink taken but simply that for the moment there 
were no grounds for his favouring one direction rather than another, against Tommy 
Moore’s plinth. Yet he durst not dally. Was it not from brooding shill I, shall I, dilly, dally, 
that he had come out? Now the summons to move on was a subpoena. Yet he found he 
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this was he could not make out at all. Nor was it the moment for self-examination. He had 
experienced little or no trouble coming back from the Park Gate along the north quay, 
he had taken the Bridge and Westmoreland Street in his stride, and now he suddenly 
found himself good for nothing but to loll against the plinth of this bull-necked bard, and 
wait for a sign.24
As with Buridan’s ass, famously positioned exactly halfway between hay and water such 
that it cannot choose between them, and as a result eventually dies of both hunger and 
thirst, Belacqua is unable to choose. However, in Belacqau’s case it is not, as with the 
ass, that both choices are equally attractive, or as with Eveline that one choice (doing 
nothing) is more attractive than the other, but rather that all options are equally unat-
tractive. As Andrew Gibson puts it, “The range of choices matters little. Belacqua has 
no foundation for any choice . . . Choice itself implodes.”25 Many of Beckett’s letters 
written from Dublin at the time he was working on More Pricks return to this lack of 
grounds for choice: “I long to be away and of course can’t bear the idea of going & 
can’t understand why Hamburg, where it won’t be warm and where I will probably be 
frightened.”26 A little later he speaks of “the old cowardice of keeping one[’]s hand off 
the future. And I’m too old and too poor in guts or spunk or whatever the stuff is to 
endow the old corpse with a destination & buy a ticket & pack up here.”27 The sugges-
tion that there is no system of value that underwrites Belacqua’s choices is emphasized 
further in the manner in which he finally chooses, in the next story, “A Wet Night,” a 
direction in which to go. The impetus is provided not by some higher system of value, 
but by the random blinkings of the illuminated Bovril sign that used to be attached 
to one of the buildings in this part of Dublin: “Belacqua had been proffered a sign, 
Bovril had made him a sign.” The choice is thereby reduced to one between two public 
houses, and finally it is the quality of the beer he will find in the respective hostelries 
that moves him one way rather than another: he would go “where the porter is well 
up,” and where he could avoid “poets and peasants and politicians.”28 These are hardly 
the kind of choice-informing values that Windelband had in mind. 
In Beckett’s next work, Murphy, the idea of a transcendental system of values is 
subject to questioning in a different way. On its very first page the novel announces 
that Murphy inhabits a “big world” in which things have no value other than that given 
to them by the “mercantile gehenna”; this is the arbitrary value of exchange, of “quid 
pro quo” as the cuckoo clock puts it (M, 27, 3). Murphy’s response is to attempt to 
escape into “the little world” of the mind, in the manner (in his view) of the patients 
in the Magdalen Mental Mercyseat, an asylum in which he later finds employment. 
These patients, he feels, have attained the ideal state of world-abnegation expressed 
in Geulincx’s maxim, quoted in the novel: Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis; where you are 
worth nothing, there you should want nothing (M, 112). It should be noted that this 
phrase, taken down by Beckett in his notes from Windelband, is concerned with value, 
claiming that this should not be attached either to the subject or to the world. However, 
before self- or world-abnegation (and from there, Geulincx’s philosophy) themselves 
become things of value, the irony, as in More Pricks, is stacked against Murphy. This 
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. . . is so finely maintained that all the statements fall just short of assent,” while Gibson 
argues that irony is the means by which “Beckett most clearly tips the balance against 
Murphy’s choices.”29 Thus the narrator says that the difference which Murphy makes 
between the big world and the little is “lovingly simplified and perverted,” while the 
patients’ “frequent expressions apparently of pain, rage, despair and in fact all the usual” 
suggested “a fly somewhere in the ointment of the Microcosmos” (i.e., in Murphy’s 
idealization of the patients’ little worlds) which Murphy “either disregarded or muted 
to mean what he wanted” (M, 112–23). 
If the rejection of transcendental values is one way in which Beckett’s fiction is at 
odds with Windelband’s philosophy, then the former’s gravitation towards superfluous 
detail, selected without any regard for value, is its corollary. Where history and literary 
biography must reject the example of Goethe’s lock, Beckett, in Watt, written between 
1941 and 1944 (and his first text since the statement in his German Diary), indicates 
how the “straws, flotsam” might be incorporated into his fiction, distorting not just 
the art of literature (by forcing it to include material it normally omits), but also the 
philosophical system. Where the latter is concerned, Ackerley and Gontarski note 
the novel’s concern with scholastic categories: “Quis? quid? ubi quibis auxiliis? cur? 
quomodo quando? (Who? what? when? by what means? why? in what way? when?).”30 
Richard N. Coe has called Watt “a pilgrimage in search of meaning” in a “jungle of 
hypotheses,” and in the absence of meaning, Watt (and his surrogate narrator, Sam) 
has no way to choose what to select and what to leave out.31 Thus the novel (in the 
loosest possible sense of the term) contains a section entitled “Addenda,” into which 
material is shunted not because it is less valuable than anything in the novel proper, but 
because “Only fatigue and disgust prevented its incorporation.”32 Here we find flotsam 
that are not dissimilar in their focus on given names, assumed names and traditions to 
what Beckett copies from page 354 of Windelband (see above): “Art Con O’Connery, 
called Black Velvet O’Connery, product of the great Shinnery-Slattery tradition” (W, 
215). The lack of any means of selection, though, is most apparent in the infamous 
passages which detail every possible permutation of a proposition. The following is 
but one example of many: 
With regard to the so important matter of Mr Knott’s physical appearance, Watt had 
unfortunately little or nothing to say. For one day Mr Knott would be tall, fat, pale and 
dark, and the next thin, small, flushed and fair, and the next sturdy, middlesized, yellow 
and ginger, and the next small, fat, pale and fair, and the next middlesized, flushed, thin 
and ginger, and the next tall, yellow, dark and sturdy, and the next fat, middlesized, ginger 
and pale, and the next tall, thin, dark and flushed, and the next . . . (W, 181)
And so on for another page and a half. However, this is not to suggest a preference for 
valuelessness on Beckett’s part. He is well aware of the paradox of value: it is all too 
easy to end up valuing the devaluation of value. In a conversation with Charles Juliet, 
Beckett commented, “Negation is no more possible than affirmation. It is absurd to say 
that something is absurd. That’s still a value judgment. It is impossible to protest, and 
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after the composition of the “Philosophy Notes,” and more than two decades after 
Watt, Beckett’s comments illustrate an attitude towards “normative values” that is 
nonetheless discernible in these texts. The value of the “straws, flotsam” is apparently 
that they undermine all attempts to establish a system of values. This is reinforced in 
Molloy (written 1947, published 1951). At one point in the novel, at the end of a long 
digression, the narrator says, “I apologise for these details, in a moment we’ll go faster, 
much faster”; however, he adds, “And then perhaps relapse again into a wealth of filthy 
circumstance”; this in turn will “give way to vast frescoes, dashed off with loathing.”34 If 
details fare no better here than normative values, then it seems highly significant that 
the next line of the text evokes Protagoras: “Homo mensura can’t do without staffage.” 
Staffage is a term used in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century landscape painting to 
denote the human (and sometimes animal) figures which are depicted in the scene, 
but which are not the main subject matter of the painting; they are included merely 
to balance the composition or in the interests of decoration.
This last example shows the long process of transformation that Windelband’s account 
of the history of Western philosophy undergoes at Beckett’s hands: from a first stage, 
in which Windelband’s text is purged and warped to produce a uniquely Beckettian 
text, to a second stage, in which not just the images that Beckett finds in A History of 
Philosophy but also Windelband’s own philosophy are subject to further distortion. All 
of this goes to underline that A History of Philosophy remained a key text for Beckett, 
many years after he first encountered it, allowing him to “get back to ignorance” and 
develop his “knowledge of non-knowledge.” 
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